]>

christian@amsuess.com

Internet CoRE CoRE, Web Linking, Resource Discovery, Resource Directory, Proxy A collection of extensions to the Resource Directory that can stand on their own, and have no clear future in specification yet. Discussion Venues Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction This document pools some extensions to the Resource Directory that might be useful but have no place in the original document. They might become individual documents for IETF submission, simple registrations in the RD Parameter Registry at IANA, or grow into a shape where they can be submitted as a collection of tools. At its current state, this draft is a collection of ideas.

Reverse Proxy requests When a registrant registers at a Resource Directory, it might not have a suitable address it can use as a base address. Typical reasons include being inside a NAT without control over port forwarding, or only being able to open outgoing connections (as program running inside a web browser utilizing CoAP over WebSocket might be). suggests (in the Cellular M2M use case) that proxy access to such endpoints can be provided, it gives no concrete mechanism to do that; this is such a mechanism. This mechanism is intended to be a last-resort option to provide connectivity. Where possible, direct connections are preferred. Before registering for proxying, the registrant should attempt to obtain a publicly available port, for example using PCP (). The same mechanism can also be employed by registrants that want to conceal their network address from its clients. A deployed application where this is implicitly done is LwM2M [citation missing]. Notable differences are that the protocol used between the client and the proxying RD is not CoAP but application specific, and that the RD (depending on some configuration) eagerly populates its proxy caches by sending requests and starting observations at registration time.

Discovery An RD that provides proxying functionality advertises it by announcing the additional resource type "TBD1" on its directory resource.

Registration A client passes the "proxy=yes" or "proxy=ondemand" query parameter in addition to (but typically instead of) a "base" query parameter. A server that receives a "proxy=yes" query parameter in a registration (or receives "proxy=ondemand" and decides it needs to proxy) MUST come up with a "Proxy URL" on which it accepts requests, and which it uses as a Registration Base URI for lookups on the present registration. The Proxy URL SHOULD have no path component, as acting as a reverse proxy in such a scenario means that any relative references in all representations that are proxied must be recognized and possibly rewritten. The RD MAY accept connections also on alternative Registration Base URIs using different protocols; it can advertise them using the mechanisms of . The registrant is not informed of the chosen public name by the RD. ( discusses means how to change that). This mechanism is applicable to all transports that can be used to register. If proxying is active, the restrictions on when the base parameter needs to be present ( Registration template) are relaxed: The base parameter may also be absent if the connection originates from an ephemeral port, as long as the underlying protocol supports role reversal, and link-local IPv6 addresses may be used without any concerns of expressibility. If the client uses the role reversal rule relaxation, both it and the server keep that connection open for as long as it wants to be reachable. When the connection terminates, the RD SHOULD treat the registration as having timed out (even if its lifetime has not been exceeded) and MAY eventually remove the registration. It is yet to be decided whether the RD's announced ability to do proxying should imply that infinite lifetimes are necessarily supported for such registrations; at least, it is RECOMMENDED.

Registration updates The "proxy" query parameter can not be changed or repeated in a registration update; RD servers MUST answer 4.00 Bad Request to any registration update that has a "proxy" query parameter. As always, registration updates can explicitly or implicitly update the Registration Base URI. In proxied registrations, those changes are not propagated to lookup, but do change the forwarding address of the proxy. For example, if a registration is established over TCP, an update can come along in a new TCP connection. Starting then, proxied requests are forwarded along that new connection.

Proxy behavior The RD operates as a reverse-proxy as described in Section 5.7.3 at the announced Proxy URL(s), where it decides based on the requested host and port to which registrant endpoint to forward the request. The address the incoming request are forwarded to is the base address of the registration. If an explicit "base" paremter is given, the RD will forward requests to that location. Otherwise, it forwards to the registration's source address (which is the implied base parameter). When an implicit base is used, the requests forwarded by the RD to the EP contain no Uri-Host option. EPs that want to run multiple parallel registrations (especially gateway-like devices) can either open up separate connections, or use an additional (to-be-specified) mechanism to set the "virtual host name" for that registration in a separate argument.

Limitations from using a reverse proxy The registrant requesting the reverse proxying needs to ensure that all services it provides are compatible with being operated behind a reverse proxy with an unknown name. In particular, this rules out all applications that refer to local resources by a full URI (as opposed to relative references without scheme and host). Applications behind a reverse proxy can not use role reversal. Some of these limitations can be mitigated if the application knows its advertised address. The mechanisms of might be used to change that.

On-Demand proxying If an endpoint is deployed in an unknown network, it might not know whether it is behind a NAT that would require it to configure an explicit base address, and ask the RD to assist by proxying if necessary by registering with the "proxy=ondemand" query parameter. A server receiving that SHOULD use a different IP address to try to access the registrant's .well-known/core file using a GET request under the Registration Base URI. If that succeeds, it may assume that no NAT is present, and ignore the proxying request. Otherwise, it configures proxying as if "proxy=yes" were requested. Note that this is only a heuristic [ and not tested in deployments yet ].

Multiple upstreams When a proxying RD is operating behind a router that has uplinks with multiple provisioning domains (see ) or a similar setup, it MAY mint multiple addresses that are reachable on the respective provisioning domains. When possible, it is preferred to keep the number of URIs handed out low (avoiding URI aliasing); this can be achieved by announcing both the proxy's public addresses under the same wildcard name. If RDs are announced by the uplinks using RDAO, the proxy may use the methods of to distribute its registrations to all the announced upstream RDs. In such setups, the router can forward the upstream RDs using the PvD option () to PvD-aware hosts and only announce the local RD to PvD-unaware ones (which then forwards their registrations). It can be expected that PvD-aware endpoints are capable of registering with multiple RDs simultaneously.

Examples

Registration through a firewall ;rt="example.x" Req from other-address.rd.example.net: GET coap://[2001:db8:42::9876]/.well-known/core Request blocked by stateful firewall around [2001:db8:42::] RD decides that proxying is necessary Res: 2.04 Created Location: /reg/abcd ]]> Later, lookup of that registration might say: ;rt="example.x ]]> A request to that resource will end up at an IP address of the RD, which will forward it using its the IP and port on which the registrant had registered as source port, thus reaching the registrant through the stateful firewall.

Registration from a browser context ;rt="core.s" Res: 2.04 Created Location: /reg/123 ]]> The gyroscope can now not only be looked up in the RD, but also be reached: ;rt="core.s" ]]> In this example, the RD has chosen to do port-based rather than host-based virtual hosting and announces its literal IP address as that allows clients to not send the lengthy Uri-Host option with all requests.

Notes on stability and maturity Using this with UDP can be quite fragile; the author only draws on own experience that this can work across cell-phone NATs and does not claim that this will work over generic firewalls. [ It may make sense to have the example as TCP right away. ]

Security considerations An RD MAY impose additional restrictions on which endpoints can register for proxying, and thus respond 4.01 Unauthorized to request that would pass had they not requested proxying. Attackers could do third party registrations with an attacked device's address as base URI, though the RD would probably not amplify any attacks in that case. The RD MUST NOT reveal the address at which it reaches the registrant except for adaequately authenticated and authorized debugging purposes, as that address could reveal sensitive location data the registrant may wish to hide by using a proxy. Usual caveats for proxies apply.

Alternatives to be explored With the mechanisms of , an RD could also operate as a forward proxy, and indicate its availability for that purpose in a has-proxy link it creates on its own, and which it makes discoverable through its lookup interfaces. How a registrant opts in to that behavior, how it selects a suitable public address (using the base attribute is tempting, but conflicts with the currently prescribed proxy behavior) and for which scenarios this is preferable is a topic being explored. As with the reverse proxy address, the registrant is not informed of the public addresses (though again, can be used to change that). Knowing these addresses can be relevant when the endpoint advertises its services out of band (e.g. by showing a QR code or exposing links through NFC), but also when the mechanism of Appendix D is used.

Infinite lifetime An RD can indicate support for infinite lifetimes by adding the resoruce type "TBD2" to its list of resource types. A registrant that wishes to keep its registration alive indefinitely can set the lifetime value as "lt=inf". Registrations with infinite lifetimes never time out on their own. Registrations whose base is explicit are not "soft state"; the registrant can expect the RD to persist the registrations across network changes, reboots, softare updates and that like. Registrations with an implicit base are kept active by the RD for as long as they are reachable; the RD should make reasonable efforts to persist them, but will remove them when they are unavailable temporarily, which may happen outside of the RD's control. Typical use cases for infinite life times are:

• Commissioning tools (CTs) that do not return to the deployment site, and thus can not refresh the soft state
• Proxy registrations whose lifetime is limited by a connection that is kept alive. Once the connection terminates even temporarily, the RD has no means of restoring the connection, and removes the registration. (Exceptionally, the RD can make such an attempt if the registration happened over a role-reversed TCP connection).
• Simple registrations. For those, the RD keeps the registration active as long as it can obtain a Valid response for the .well-known/core document on the endpoint, checked at intervals guided by its Max-Age.

Example Had the example of discovered support for infinite lifetimes during lookup like this: ;rt="core.rd TBD1 TBD2";ct=40 ]]> it could register like that: ;rt="core.s" Res: 2.04 Created Location: /reg/123 ]]> and never need to update the registration for as long as the websocket connection is open. (When it gets terminated, it could try renewing the registration, but needs to be prepared for the RD to already have removed the original registration.)

Limited lifetimes Even if an RD supports infinite lifetimes, it may not accept them from just any registrant. Even more, an RD may have policies in place that require a certain frequency of updates and thus place an upper limit on lt lower than the technical limit of 136 years. This document does not define any means of communicating lifetime limits, but explores a few options:

• Administrative channels. An RD that sees registrations with unreasonably long lifetimes can flag them for its operator to take further measures. While sounding tediously manual, this captures the observation that different components are configured in a softly incompatible way, and need operator intervention (because if there were automatic means, they obviously failed).
• General advertisement of preferred lifetimes. When the limitations on the lifetimes are not from authorization but from general setup, an RD could advertise that property in a to-be-created link target attribute of its registration resource. Different attributes could express preference or hard limits. This information is also available easily for registrants, which may then heed the advice if supported, and may notify their operators that they just started spending more resources than they were configured to. It is also available to tools that provision endpoints with their RD address (and parameters), as they can use the same lookup interface.
• Per-registration information. For soft limits, the RD can offer the endpoint additional metadata if it queries them post-registration. That query can use the endpoint lookup interface, or the extension of . This may require additional round-trips on the part of endpoint.
• Hard limits informed by error codes. An RD can reject registrations with overly long lifetimes if the endpoint is not authorized to use such long lifetimes with a 4.01 Unauthorized error. The mechanisms of , with a to-be-defined error detail on the permissible lifetime, can be used to propagate information back to then endpoint. This behavior is explicitly NOT RECOMMENDED, because devices may crucially depend on the RD's services -- this rejection may even be the reason why the device is not configured with the new settings that would contain a shorter lifetime.

Zone identifier introspection The 'split-horizon' mechanism of (that registrations with link-local bases can only be read from the zone they registered on) reduces the usability of the endpoint lookup interface for debugging purposes. To allow an administrator to read out the "show-zone-id" query parameter for endpoint and resource lookup is introduced. A Resource Directory that understands this parameter MUST NOT limit lookup results to registrations from the lookup's zone, and MUST use zone identifiers to annotate which zone those registrations are valid on. The RD MUST limit such requests to authenticated and authorized debugging requests, as registrants may rely on the RD to keep their presence secret from other links.

Example ;base="coap://[2001:db8::1]";et=printer;ep="bigprinter", ;base="coap://[fe80::99%wlan0]";et=printer;ep="localprinter-1234", ;base="coap://[fe80::99%eth2]";et=printer;ep="localprinter-5678", ]]>

Proxying multicast requests Multicast requests are hard to forward at a proxy: Even if a media type is used in which multiple responses can be aggregated transparently, the proxy can not reliably know when all responses have come in. Section 2.9 describes the difficulties in more detail. Note that provides a mechanism that does allow the forwarding of multicast requests. It is yet to be determined what the respective pros and cons are. Conversely, that lookup mechanism may also serve as an alternative to resource lookup on an RD. A proxy MAY expose an interface compatible with the RD lookup interface, which SHOULD be advertised by a link to it that indicates the resource types core.rd-lookup-res and TBD4. The proxy sends multicast requests to All CoAP Nodes ( Section 12.8) requesting their .well-known/core files either eagerly (ie. in regular intervals independent of queries) or on demand (in which case it SHOULD limit the results by applying query filtering; if it has received multiple query parameters it should forward the one it deems most likely to limit the results, as .well-known/core only supports a single query parameter). In comparison to classical RD operation, this RD behaves roughly as if it had received a simple registration with a All CoAP Nodes address as the source address, if such behavior were specified. The individual registrations that result from this neither have an explicit registration resource nor an explicit endpoint name; given that the endpoint lookup interface is not present on such proxies, neither can be queried. Clients that would intend to do run a multicast discovery operation behind the proxy can then instead query that resource lookup interface. They SHOULD use observation on lookups, as an on-demand implementation MAY return the first result before others have arrived, or MAY even return an empty link set immediately.

Example ;rt="core.rd-lookup-res TBD4";ct=40 Req: GET coap+ws://gateway.example.com/discover?rt=core.s Observe: 0 Res: 2.05 Content Observe: 0 Content-Format: 40 (empty payload) ]]> At the same time, the proxy sends out multicast requests on its interfaces: ;ct="0 112";rt="core.s" Res (from [2001:db8::2]:5683): 2.05 Content ;ct="0 112";rt="core.s" ]]> upon receipt of which it sends out a notification to the websocket client: ;ct="0 112";rt="core.s";anchor="coap://[2001:db8::1]", ;ct="0 112";rt="core.s";anchro="coap://[2001:db8::2]" ]]>

Registrations that update DNS records An RD that is provisioned with means to update a DNS zone and that has a known mapping from registrants to host names could use registrations to populate DNS records from registration base addresses. When combined with , these records point to the RD's built-in proxy rather than to the base address. This mechanism is not described in further detail yet as it does not interact well yet with how the base registration attribute interacts with the proxy announcements of .

Propagating server generated registration information The RD can populate some data into the registration: The RD may pick the sector and endpoint name based on the endpoint's credentials, or (as introduced in this documents) reverse proxy names and soft lifetime limits can be added. With the exception of sector and endpoint name, the registrant can query those properties through the endpoint lookup interface. However, this is cumbersome as it requires it to use both the registration and the lookup interface. The architecture of offers a different architectural setup: Applied to the RD, the registration would generate both a registration metadata resource (at which the registrant can set or query its registration's metadata) and a registration link resource (which contains all the links the registrant provides). Such a setup would make it easier for registrants to query or update registration metadata, including querying for an implicitly assigned endpoint name or sector. Extending the RD specification to allow this style of operation would be possible without altering its client facing interfaces. Alternatively, using a new media type for operations on the registration resource and/or the FETCH and PATCH methods would enable such operations in a less intrusive way. While it would be tempting to add an Accept option to the registration request to solicit immediate information on the registration that was just created, the Accept option's criticality would render this incompatible with existing servers. The option can still be set if the new content format is advertised by the RD. Without any media type suggested so far, this is what a registration could look like if the RD advertised that it provided content format TBD6 on the registration interface: ;rt="example.x" Res: 2.04 Created Location: /reg/abcd Content-Format: TBD6 Payload: Soft lifetime limit 3600, please update your registration in time. Forward proxy services are offered at coaps+ws://rd.example.net and coaps+tcp://rd.example.net. ]]>

Combining simple registration with EDHOC and ACE For very constrained devices, starting a simple registration may be the only occasion at which they use the CoAP client role. If they exclusively send piggybacked responses () and handle only idempotent requests, they can completely avoid the need for handling retransmissions. This section presents some patterns in which an endpoint can register securely without implementing more CoAP features.

Generic EDHOC in reverse flow When such a endpoints uses EDHOC , it can follow this flow: The endpoints requests simple registration with its RD. This request is unencrypted. Both for privacy reasons and to reduce configuration effort, the endpoints elides the ep registration parameter -- it will be established during authentication anyway. The endpoint may set the No-Response option defined in , given it is not relying on the response but waiting for the OSCORE context to be established. TBD: Can we establish the correctness of the parameters somewhere later? (It could if it repeated any parameters in EAD3, at least as an empty item indicating that it's a simple registration). The RD initiates an EDHOC exchange as part of its query for the endpoints's /.well-known/core resource. As the endpoints has the more vulnerable identity, EDHOC is performed in reverse message flow. After the RD has received message 3, it sends the GET request for the endpoints's /.well-known/core resource to complete the registration and responds to the original unencrypted registration. TBD: Can the endpoints obtain confirmation that it is now registered? (It could, if the EAD3 item above is critical: then, the presence of OSCORE traffic with that key material implies acceptance of that EAD3.)

ACE roles In an ACE context (), the endpoints is the Resource Server (RS), and the RD is the client (C). This is aligned with the endpoints' capabilities: The RD is in a position to talk to the ACE Authorization Server (AS) and obtain a token to enable communication with the endpoints, and the endpoints does not need to perform any additional communication. The token's audience may be "any endpoint eligible for RD registration" or a particular endpoint. Its subject is the RD. Its scope is to read the /.well-known/core resource. In some scenarios it may make sense to operate the AS and the RD in a single system, in which case communication between those parties is cut short.

ACE EDHOC profile When the ACE EDHOC profile is used, the RD needs to upload its token to the endpoints's authz-info endpoint (which is a term from ACE, using "endpoint" for a resource path and not for a host as the RD specification does) before executing EDHOC, because sending a token is only supported in EDHOC messages 1 and 3 (whereas the RD sends message 2). The posted token needs to be issued for the audience group of all eligible endpoints, as the RD does not know the identity of the endpoint at this stage. When the endpoint sends its credentials, the RD will know from matching the endpoint's credentials against the rs_cnf2 and aud2 list it obtained with the token (defined in ) which endpoint is being registered. Both parties can use kid as their ID_CRED_x to keep messages small. The endpoint receives the full ID_CRED of the RD as part of the signed token; the RD can look up the ID_CRED of the endpoint in its rs_cnf2 data. Hypothetically, if a token were permitted to be sent in message 2, the RS could do that, and save the extra round-trip for POSTing the token. Alternatively, the RD could initiate EDHOC in forward message flow. By the time it receives the endpoint's credentials (eg. kid) in message 2, it can ask the AS for a token suitable for that particular endpoint, or find a suitable token in a list it has obtained earlier (TBD: how?). This workflow has the downside of revealing the endpoint's ID_CRED_x to active attackers. This may be acceptable, especially when the endpoint is only sending a kid, and more so if the AS has a means of updating that ID.

ACE OSCORE profile In the ACE OSCORE profile , a token is used that contains symmetric key material. The message flow is similar to EDHOC and OSCORE: The endpoint sends an unencrypted registration request, but the endpoint needs to publicly reveal its identity by sending the ep registration parameter. Then, the RD can obtain a token for this particular endpoint. Like in ACE EDHOC, it POSTs it to the endpoint's authz-info endpoint; in addition, it sends a random nonce and receives one in the response. Without any further steps, it can then derive an OSCORE context from the token and the nonces, and send an OSCORE request for the endpoint's /.well-known/core resource. This mode of operation is only recommended if the endpoint already makes its identity public for other reasons.

ACE OSCORE profile without ACE When assigning the reversed ACE roles to the participants, there is a mode of operation that enables the ACE OSCORE profile while preserving privacy of the endpoint: If the endpoint is provisioned with a public key of the AS in addition to the symmetric material it shares with it in the ACE OSCORE profile, the device can generate a token containing a secret key, symmstrically encrypt (or MAC it) for the AS, and asymmetrically encrypt it for the AS (eg. using Direct Key Agreement). It then initiates the ACE OSCORE profile with the RD, which needs to introspect the token at the AS to obtain the secret key material within. This token's roles are different: Its subject is an endpoint, its audience is the RD, and its scope is to register with a particular endpoint name. The AS verifies during introspection whether the endpoint is actually eligible to do this. It is unsure whether this whole process provides complexity benefits over the EDHOC based workflow, given that it does necessitate an asymmetric operation. (Note that while it is well possible to perform ACE OSCORE profile without the asymmetrical step, for example by just symmetrically encrypting the token created by the endpoint, by provisioning the endpoint with a single token response containing a token encrypted to the RS, or with one containing an abbreviated token which the RS can introspect at the AS, this adds little compared to , because the endpoint's initial message will always contain identical parts that allow identification. The endpoint creating a random token and encrypting it symmetrically to the AS is almost viable and privacy preserving, but decrypting the token at the AS without any information identifying the symmetric ke would scale badly.)

References Normative References In many Internet of Things (IoT) applications, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which contains information about resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources. The input to an RD is composed of links, and the output is composed of links constructed from the information stored in the RD. This document specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, look up, and remove information on resources. Furthermore, new target attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined. Discovery of endpoints and resources in M2M applications over large networks is enabled by Resource Directories, but no special consideration has been given to how such directories can scale beyond what can be managed by a single device. This document explores different ways in which Resource Directories can be scaled up from single network to enterprise and global scale. It does not attempt to standardize any of those methods, but only to demonstrate the feasibility of such extensions and to provide terminology and exploratory groundwork for later documents. This document describes how the zone identifier of an IPv6 scoped address, defined as in the IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture (RFC 4007), can be represented in a literal IPv6 address and in a Uniform Resource Identifier that includes such a literal address. It updates the URI Generic Syntax specification (RFC 3986) accordingly. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments. Informative References The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), although inspired by HTTP, was designed to use UDP instead of TCP. The message layer of CoAP over UDP includes support for reliable delivery, simple congestion control, and flow control. Some environments benefit from the availability of CoAP carried over reliable transports such as TCP or Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document outlines the changes required to use CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets transports. It also formally updates RFC 7641 for use with these transports and RFC 7959 to enable the use of larger messages over a reliable transport. The Port Control Protocol allows an IPv6 or IPv4 host to control how incoming IPv6 or IPv4 packets are translated and forwarded by a Network Address Translator (NAT) or simple firewall, and also allows a host to optimize its outgoing NAT keepalive messages. TUD Dresden University of Technology The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP, [RFC7252]) is available over different transports (UDP, DTLS, TCP, TLS, WebSockets), but lacks a way to unify these addresses. This document provides terminology and provisions based on Web Linking [RFC8288] and Service Bindings (SVCB, [RFC9460]) to express alternative transports available to a device, and to optimize exchanges using these. This document is a product of the work of the Multiple Interfaces Architecture Design team. It outlines a solution framework for some of the issues experienced by nodes that can be attached to multiple networks simultaneously. The framework defines the concept of a Provisioning Domain (PvD), which is a consistent set of network configuration information. PvD-aware nodes learn PvD-specific information from the networks they are attached to and/or other sources. PvDs are used to enable separation and configuration consistency in the presence of multiple concurrent connections. Provisioning Domains (PvDs) are defined as consistent sets of network configuration information. PvDs allows hosts to manage connections to multiple networks and interfaces simultaneously, such as when a home router provides connectivity through both a broadband and cellular network provider. This document defines a mechanism for explicitly identifying PvDs through a Router Advertisement (RA) option. This RA option announces a PvD identifier, which hosts can compare to differentiate between PvDs. The option can directly carry some information about a PvD and can optionally point to PvD Additional Information that can be retrieved using HTTP over TLS. This document defines a concise "problem detail" as a way to carry machine-readable details of errors in a Representational State Transfer (REST) response to avoid the need to define new error response formats for REST APIs for constrained environments. The format is inspired by, but intended to be more concise than, the problem details for HTTP APIs defined in RFC 7807. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for constrained devices and constrained networks. It is anticipated that constrained devices will often naturally operate in groups (e.g., in a building automation scenario, all lights in a given room may need to be switched on/off as a group). This specification defines how CoAP should be used in a group communication context. An approach for using CoAP on top of IP multicast is detailed based on existing CoAP functionality as well as new features introduced in this specification. Also, various use cases and corresponding protocol flows are provided to illustrate important concepts. Finally, guidance is provided for deployment in various network topologies. RISE AB IoTconsultancy.nl This document specifies the operations performed by a proxy, when using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) in group communication scenarios. Such a proxy processes a single request sent by a client over unicast, and distributes the request over IP multicast to a group of servers. Then, the proxy collects the individual responses from those servers and relays those responses back to the client, in a way that allows the client to distinguish the responses and their origin servers through embedded addressing information. This document updates RFC7252 with respect to caching of response messages at proxies. This specification defines Web Linking using a link format for use by constrained web servers to describe hosted resources, their attributes, and other relationships between links. Based on the HTTP Link Header field defined in RFC 5988, the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format is carried as a payload and is assigned an Internet media type. "RESTful" refers to the Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. A well-known URI is defined as a default entry point for requesting the links hosted by a server. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Ericsson Dogtiger Labs Ericsson This document describes a publish-subscribe architecture for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), extending the capabilities of CoAP communications for supporting endpoints with long breaks in connectivity and/or up-time. CoAP clients publish on and subscribe to a topic via a corresponding topic resource at a CoAP server acting as broker. Ericsson AB Ericsson AB Ericsson AB This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios and a main use case is to establish an OSCORE security context. By reusing COSE for cryptography, CBOR for encoding, and CoAP for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low. There can be machine-to-machine (M2M) scenarios where server responses to client requests are redundant. This kind of open-loop exchange (with no response path from the server to the client) may be desired to minimize resource consumption in constrained systems while updating many resources simultaneously or performing high-frequency updates. CoAP already provides Non-confirmable (NON) messages that are not acknowledged by the recipient. However, the request/response semantics still require the server to respond with a status code indicating "the result of the attempt to understand and satisfy the request", per RFC 7252. This specification introduces a CoAP option called 'No-Response'. Using this option, the client can explicitly express to the server its disinterest in all responses against the particular request. This option also provides granular control to enable expression of disinterest to a particular response class or a combination of response classes. The server MAY decide to suppress the response by not transmitting it back to the client according to the value of the No-Response option in the request. This option may be effective for both unicast and multicast requests. This document also discusses a few examples of applications that benefit from this option. This specification defines a framework for authentication and authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE-OAuth. The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), thus transforming a well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases. Ericsson Ericsson RISE RISE This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It utilizes Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) for achieving mutual authentication between an ACE-OAuth Client and Resource Server, and it binds an authentication credential of the Client to an ACE-OAuth access token. EDHOC also establishes an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Security Context, which is used to secure communications when accessing protected resources according to the authorization information indicated in the access token. This profile can be used to delegate management of authorization information from a resource-constrained server to a trusted host with less severe limitations regarding processing power and memory. RISE AB Ericsson AB This document updates the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Framework (ACE, RFC 9200) as follows. First, it defines a new, alternative workflow that the authorization server can use for uploading an access token to a resource server on behalf of the client. Second, it defines new parameters and encodings for the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint at the authorization server. Third, it defines a method for the ACE framework to enforce bidirectional access control by means of a single access token. Fourth, it amends two of the requirements on profiles of the framework. Finally, it deprecates the original payload format of error responses that convey an error code, when CBOR is used to encode message payloads. For such error responses, it defines a new payload format aligned with RFC 9290, thus updating in this respect also the profiles of ACE defined in RFC 9202, RFC 9203, and RFC 9431. This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It utilizes Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) to provide communication security and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an OAuth 2.0 access token. ARM The Constrained RESTful Application Language (CoRAL) defines a data model and interaction model as well as a compact serialization formats for the description of typed connections between resources on the Web ("links"), possible operations on such resources ("forms"), and simple resource metadata.

Attic Several extensions to the RD have been proposed in earlier versions of this document and were removed; this section summarizes them, lists where to look up the latest version, and gives reasons for their removal:

• Opportunistic RD (until -10) Describes how moderately capable devices can automatically configure and advertise themselves as an RD while no administratively configured RD is present. Removed due to large complexity and lack of real use cases.
• Lifetime age (until -10) References to allow administrators to see how much of a registration's lifetime has expired. Removed in favor of more generic provenance mechanisms described in , and for lack of use cases.
• Lookup across link relations (until -10) Describes how a lookup may be combined ahead of time with requests for following more link relations. Removed in favor of utilizing FETCH requests.

Change log Since -10:

• Describe implications of simple registration with infinite lifetime.
• Point out applicability of No-Response option.

Since -09:

• Added section on use with EDHOC and ACE security
• Moved Opportunistic RD, Lifetime age and Lookup across link relations into the newly created attic.

Since -08:

• Add section on propagating server generated information.
• Reference transport-indication appendix as one reason why propagation can be relevant.

Since -07:

• Update references.

Since -06:

• Add sketch for DNS updates.
• Add sketch for forward proxying.
• Fix erroneous section numbers.

Since -05:

• Add section on Limited Lifetimes.
• Point out limitations to applications that use reverse proxying.
• Minor reference and bugfix updates.

Since -04:

• Minor adjustments:
  • Mention LwM2M and how it is already doing RD proxying.
  • Tie proxying in with infinite lifetimes.
  • Remove note on not being able to switch protocols: RDs that support some future protocol negotiation can do that.
  • Point out that there is no Uri-Host from the RD proxy to the EP, but there could be.
  • Infinite lifetimes: Take up CTs more explicitly from RD discussion.
  • Start exploring interactions with groupcomm-proxy.

Since -03:

• Added interaction with PvD (Provisioning Domains)

Since -02:

• Added abstract
• Added example of CoRAL FETCH to Lookup across link relations section

Since -01:

• Added section on Opportunistic RDs

Since -00:

• Add multicast proxy usage pattern
• ondemand proxying: Probing queries must be sent from a different address
• proxying: Point to RFC7252 to describe how the actual proxying happens
• proxying: Describe this as a last-resort options and suggest attempting PCP first

Acknowledgements [ Reviews from: Jaime Jimenez ] was inspired by Ben Kaduk's comments from reviewing . Marco Tiloca pointed out the usefulness of the No-Response option in simple registration.