


IPv6: Are we really ready to turn off IPv4?










In-situ transition...


We had this plan ...




Time










We're stuck in Phase 2


Some 15% - 20% of Internet users have IPv6 capability

Most new IP deployments use IPv6+ (NATTED) IPv4

IPv4-only Legacy networks are being (gradually) migrated to dual stack




The Map of iPv6 penetration - August 2017



The Map of iPv6 penetration - August 2017

We're stuck in Phase 2





Dual Stack networks use apps that prefer to use a IPv6 connection over an IPv4 connection when both are available

This implies that the higher the IPv6 deployment numbers the less the level of use of V4 connection, and the lower the pressure on the NAT binding clients



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* Couple of problems with this:

This preference is often relative, and in the quest for ever faster connections the ante keeps rising - Apple is now pressing for a 50ms differential. This means that there is strong pressure for the iPv4 and iPv6 routing systems to be congruent - and this is just not the case today!

Secondly, it's a client/server internet, rather than a client/client network, and the number of end clients running iPv6 has to be matched against the server population



Dual Stack networks cannot drop support for IPv4 as long as significant services and user populations do not support IPv6 – and we can't tell when that may change

Nobody is really in a position to deploy a robust at-scale ipv6only network service today, even if they wanted to!

And we are not even sure if we can!



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The Issue

We cannot run Dual-Stack services indefinitely

At some point we need to support networks that only have IPv6

Is that viable?

In other words...

What do we rely on today in IPv4 that does not appear to have a clear working counterpart in IPv6?

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If the answer is "nothing" then we are done!

But if there is an issue here, then we should be working on it!

iPv4 Header

Version	IHL	Type of Service	Total Length				
Identification			Flags	Fragment Offset			
Time To Live		Protocol	Header Checksum		ksum		
Source Address							
Destination Address							
>	Padding						

iPv6 Header

Version	Class	Flow					
Payload Length			Next Header	Hop Limit			
Source Address							
Destination Address							

Type of Service is changed to Traffic Class

Flow Label Added

Options and Protocol fields replaced by Extension Headers

32 bit Fragmentation Control were pushed into an Extension Header

Checksum becomes a media layer function

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
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
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
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IPv4 "Forward Fragmentation"



IPv4 "Forward Fragmentation"





New Dependencies

For IP fragmentation to work in IPv6 then:

- all ICMPv6 messages have to be passed backwards from the interior of the network to the sender
- IPv6 packets containing a IPv6 Fragmentation Extension header should not be dropped

ICMPv6

Only the sending host now has control of fragmentation – this is a new twist

A received ICMPv6 message needs to alter the sender's state to that destination

For **TCP**, if the ICMP payload contains the TCP header, then you can pass this to the TCP control block. TCP can alter the session MSS and resend the dropped data, or you can just alter the local perdestination MSS and hope that TCP will be prompted to resend

For **UDP** – um, err, um well

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
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For **UDP** – um, err, um well

Maybe you should store the revised path MTU in a host forwarding table cache for a while

If you ever need to send another UDP packet to this host you can use this cache entry to guide your fragmentation behaviour


ICMPv6 and Anycast



It is not obvious (or even assured) that every router on the path from an anycast instance to a client host will necessarily be part of the same anycast instance "cloud"

The implication is that in anycast, the reverse ICMPv6 PTB messages will not necessarily head back to the original sender!

The extension header sits between the IPv6 packet header and the upper level protocol header for the leading fragged packet, and sits between the header and the trailing payload frags for the trailing packets



Practically, this means that transport-protocol aware packet processors/switches need to decode the extension header chain, if its present, which can consume additional cycles to process/switch a packet – and the additional time is not predictable. For trailing frags there is no transport header!

Or the unit can simply discard all Ipv6 packets that contain extension headers!

Which is what a lot of transport protocol sensitive IPv6 deployed switching equipment actually does (e.g. load balancers!)

There is a lot of "drop" behaviour in the Ipv6 Internet for Fragmentation Extension headers


RFC7872 – recorded drop rates of 30% - 40%


This experiment sent fragmented packets towards well-known servers and observed whether the server received and reconstructed the fragmented packet

But sending fragmented queries to servers is not all that common – the reverse situation of big responses is more common

So what about sending fragmented packets **BACK** from servers – what's the drop rate of the **reverse case**?

We used an ad-based measurement system, using a custom packet fragmentation wrangler as a front end to a DNS and Web server to test IPv6 fragmentation behaviour





Our Experiments were run across some 40M individual sample points:

37% of end users who used IPv6-capable DNS resolvers could not receive a fragmented IPv6 DNS response

20% of IPv6-capable end users could not receive a fragmented IPv6 packet

IPv6 Fragmentation is very unreliable

Why don't we see this unreliability in today's IPv6 networks affecting user transactions?

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Because IPv4 papers over the problem!

In a Dual-Stack environment there is always the option to flip to use IPv4 if you are stuck with Ipv6.

The DNS does this, and Happy Eyeballs does this

So there is no user-visible problem in a dual stack environment

This means that there is no urgent imperative to correct these underlying problems in deployed IPv6 networks

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Living without IPv6 Fragmentation

If we apparently don't want to fix this, can we live with it?

We are living with it in a Dual Stack world, because IPv4 just makes it all better!

But what happens when there is no IPv4 left?

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We have to avoid iPv6 Fragmentation!

TCP can work as long as IPv6 sessions use conservative MSS sizes

UDP can work as long as UDP packet sizes are capped so as to avoid fragmentation

Living without IPv6 Fragmentation

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
TCP can work as long as IPv6 sessions use conservative MSS sizes

UDP can work as long as UDP packet sizes are capped so as to avoid fragmentation Who needs to use large UDP packets anyway?

DNSSEC!


What can we do about it?

A. Get all the deployed routers and switches to deliver iCMPv6 packets and accept packets with iPv6 Fragmentation Headers




What can we do about it?

B. Get all the deployed routers and switches to alter the way iPv6 manages packet fragmentation



What can we do about it?

C. Move the DNS off UDP



Where are we?

In terms of protocol support and reliability, It seems that we are mostly ready for an IPv6only environment, with the one exception of IPv6 packet fragmentation handling.

The consequence is that today's environment cannot support an IPv6-only environment for the DNS, and DNSSEC in particular

Change the deployed iPv6 network and change vendor equipment to correctly manage fragmentation, and stop using anycast! Change host configurations and change the DNS protocol to avoid any reliance on iPv6 fragmentation

An IPv6-only Internet?

The issue of the unreliability of IPv6 fragmentation is a significant issue.

These mitigation approaches represent significant effort and cost

Effort and cost that is unnecessary for as long as IPv4 can paper over the problem!

So we are taking the easy option, and collectively we are doing nothing at all!

An IPv6-only Internet?

